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Recent evidence from U.S. markets shows that IPO underpricing is associated with high 
liquidity for issuing firms. One explanation given for this link is that IPO firms simultaneously 
decide on share retention and underpricing to maximize aftermarket liquidity. We use data from 
the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) to provide international evidence. Our results do not support 
the argument that IPO firms use underpricing as a tool to make up the reduction in liquidity 
caused by higher share retention.  We report that there is an asymmetric relationship between 
underpricing and trading volume in the short run. However, the positive link between short 
term volume and long term volume, which is shown to exist in U.S. markets, is missing in the 
ISE. Based on the explanations in prior research, we argue that the lack of persistency in initial 
broad ownership and/or investor interest may be the reason for the missing link. 
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Many papers examining IPO allocations focus on the distinction between institutional 
and individual investors. Booth and Chua (1996),  Mello and Parsons (1998), and Stoughton 
and Zechner (1998) all emphasize that underpricing leads to oversubscription to the issue and 
thus gives issuers and underwriters discretion with regard to whom to allocate shares. Giving 
priority to either investor type has its own benefits on the value of IPO firm and hence on the 
wealth of pre-IPO shareholders. The latter two papers argue that share allocation will be biased 
towards institutional investors for the purpose of establishing block ownership. Booth and Chua 
(1996), on the other hand, defend the opposite view. They argue that issuers like the increased 
liquidity associated with permanently higher aftermarket trading caused by broad ownership. 
The early work on IPO underpricing has noted a link between underpricing and trading 
volume long ago while examining other aspects of IPOs. In most cases, however, the evidence 
is for the first week after the IPO.  Regarding the trading activity, the first few weeks after an 
IPO are atypical. For example, a temporarily high trading activity is observed during this period 
for all IPOs regardless if they are underpriced or overpriced.  Analogously, the observed 
positive relationship between underpricing and trading volume may also be a temporary 
phenomenon. But unless the higher trading volume associated with higher underpricing is 
persistent as it is assumed in Booth and Chua (1996), it is not clear how the issuing firm 
benefits from underpricing. 
Two recent papers focus on the relationship between underpricing and both short-term 
and long-term trading volume. In Zheng et al. (2005), underpricing is used by the issuing firm 
as a tool, similar to that in Booth and Chua (1996), to maximize the aftermarket liquidity of its 
stock through broad ownership. In Reese (2003), the way underwriters make their price and 
share allocation decisions leads to underpricing if there is high initial investor interest for the 
IPO. Their common dependence on investor interest results in a positive relation between 
underpricing and trading volume. Although they explain it differently, both papers find a 
significant positive relationship between underpricing and liquidity associated with 
permanently higher trading in U.S. markets. 
The purpose of our paper is to provide international evidence on the question whether 
underpricing provides a more liquid aftermarket for IPOs by using data from an emerging 
market, the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE). Specifically, the following two hypotheses are 
tested: (1) Share retention is positively related to IPO underpricing. (2) Underpricing is 
associated with higher trading volume in both the short-run and the long-run. As Bekaert and 
Harvey (2002) discuss, a major contribution of emerging market research is its provision of 
different institutional, legal and regulatory environments to challenge existing models.    
We report that there is no significant relation between share retention and underpricing.  
It appears that Turkish IPO firms do not use underpricing as a tool to make up the reduction in 
liquidity caused by higher share retention. Moreover, we do not find a statistically significant 
relation between initial return and volume, if we assume a symmetric relation. Once we allow 
for an asymmetric relationship, however, we observe that overpricing is negatively related to 
trading volume in the short-run. The magnitude of initial return is not related to trading volume 
once underpricing is positive.  The initial return-trading volume relationship disappears in the 
long-run. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section reviews the 
related literature. The third section introduces the ISE and presents the data. The fourth section 
analyzes the relationship between share retention rate, IPO underpricing and trading volume.  
The last section provides the concluding remarks. 
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I. Literature Review 
Several empirical papers in the IPO literature have noted a positive relationship between 
initial volume and underpricing. For instance, Miller and Reilly (1987) link underpricing to ex 
ante uncertainty. They observe a positive underpricing-volume relation over the first five days 
of trading which is consistent with explaining underpricing by uncertainty. If the underpriced 
issues tend to be those with the greatest uncertainty, then they should display greater trading 
volume, assuming that volume is a proxy for the extent to which investors disagree about the 
value of a security. Furthermore, Schultz and Zaman (1994) examine quotes and transactions 
during the first three days of trading to find evidence regarding underwriter support to IPOs in 
the aftermarket. Although trading volume measured over 10-minute intervals on the first day of 
trading is heavy for both underpriced and overpriced IPOs, it is consistently higher for the 
former group.  They attribute the difference in trading volume to the selling of short-term 
traders. 
Hanley (1993) and Krigman et al. (1999) make similar observations. Hanley (1993) 
examines the relation between offer price revisions and both revisions in the number of shares 
issued and the extent of underpricing. He reports that turnover on the first day of trading is 
higher for issues whose offer prices exceed the offer range than that for issues whose final offer 
prices are within/below the offer range. Furthermore, this relation holds for up to two years into 
the future. Although this observation implies that more underpricing is associated with 
permanently higher level of liquidity, no explanation is given in the paper.  Krigman et al. 
(1999) examine whether the extent of flipping on the first day is related to long-term (1-year) 
performance of an IPO. By sorting sample IPOs into four groups based on initial returns, they 
report that turnover is positively related to underpricing on all days during the first week of 
trading. 
There are three popular explanations for the relationship between underpricing and 
short- and/or long-term trading volume. First, underpricing is used by underwriters as a tool to 
achieve high short-term trading volume. Underwriters have an incentive to underprice since 
high trading activity leads to higher trading profits for them in the aftermarket. Second, 
underpricing is a tool used by underwriters not to achieve high short-term trading volume but to 
reward regular investors for truthfully revealing their information. Underwriters’ price and 
allocation decisions lead to a positive relationship between underpricing and trading volume. 
Finally, underpricing is a tool used by the issuing firm to achieve higher long-term trading 
volume (permanent liquidity). 
Based on the first explanation, underwriters have incentive to use underpricing and 
discretion on the allocation of shares as a tool to achieve high initial aftermarket trading 
volume. Boehmer and Fishe (2001) argue that an active aftermarket benefits underwriters 
through increased brokerage commissions and trading profits. Underpricing causes trading, 
since shares are sold in the aftermarket to those who have higher valuations, but were rationed 
during the primary allocation.
1
 They develop a model in which underwriters face a tradeoff 
between underwriting fees, which increase with the offer price, and aftermarket trading profits, 
which decrease with the offer price. Their empirical analysis shows a significant positive 
relationship between the underwriters’s trading revenues and both initial returns and the 
fraction of shares flipped.  Ellis et al. (2000) examine trading activity of lead underwriter in the 
                                                 
1
 In addition, Boehmer and Fishe (2001) assume that underwriters also increase trading by placing some shares 
with investors, who will subsequently sell (flip) these in the aftermarket. 
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IPO aftermarket. Consistent with Boehmer and Fishe (2001), they find a significant link 
between underwriter’s trading profits and IPO underpricing.  
Based on the second explanation, higher liquidity is not a goal but a by-product as it is 
argued by Reese (2003). The reasoning relies on the book-building model of Benveniste and 
Spindt (1989). In their model, underwriters of initial public offerings use pricing and allocation 
rules to give regular investors incentive to truthfully reveal their demand. When the revealed 
demand is higher than expected, the underwriter partially adjusts the offer price upward. 
Moreover, truth-telling investors are given priority in share allocation.  This way, offer price is 
revised in the right direction without decreasing the total reward for truth-telling. In the model, 
underpricing will occur when demand exceeds the issue size leading to oversubscription. Thus, 
underpricing is directly related to the level of interest in the premarket.  
Reese (2003) argues that initial trading volume is directly related to the level of interest 
in the premarket. This common dependence results in a positive relationship between 
underpricing and initial trading volume. Reese (2003) assumes that high initial interest, high 
underpricing, and high initial trading volume together leads to both the generation of additional 
information, through increased analyst following, and reduced transactions costs. All of these 
result in high long-term trading volume. 
Based on the third explanation, issuing firms have incentive to use underpricing as a 
tool to achieve a permanently higher level of liquidity. Booth and Chua (1996) assume that 
underpricing, providing compensation for investor-borne information costs, leads to 
oversubscription to an IPO. In this case, the issuer uses its discretion in allocating shares to 
create a broad initial ownership. Ownership dispersion increases secondary market liquidity, 
which in turn reduces the required return to investors and leads to a higher firm value. The 
empirical evidence in Booth and Chua (1996) indicates that underpricing is a positive function 
of proxies for information costs. This finding gives indirect support to the hypothesis that the 
demand for ownership dispersion affects IPO underpricing. 
A second paper that uses a similar line of reasoning is Zheng et al. (2005). It assumes 
that when preparing for an IPO firms simultaneously and optimally decide on the extent of 
underpricing, share retention and the inclusion of a lockup provision to maximize the liquidity 
of the stock. In effect, the paper considers the resulting tradeoff once the Booth and Chua 
(1996) model is combined with the Leland and Pyle (1977) signaling model. Zheng et al. 
(2005) points out two channels through which share retention has a negative impact on 
liquidity. First, as pre-IPO owners retain more shares, fewer shares will be floating in the 
aftermarket. This leads to a lower trading volume, ceteris paribus. Second, when more shares 
are retained, outside investors are more likely to trade with pre-IPO owners, who usually have 
an informational advantage over them. This reduces outside investors’ trading interest and 
leads to lower liquidity.  
In Zheng et al. (2005), pre-IPO owners use underpricing to increase liquidity through 
broad ownership as in Booth and Chua (1996). They discuss two reasons for why higher share 
retention is associated with more use of underpricing. First, as more shares are retained 
underpricing becomes less costly. The reason is that, keeping percentage underpricing constant, 
the total dollar amount left on the table gets smaller with share retention. Second, with more 
shares retained, the future price of the shares in the aftermarket becomes more important for the 
pre-IPO owners and therefore higher liquidity becomes more valuable. 
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II. Data 
Reestablished in December 1985, the ISE is the only stock exchange in Turkey. It is a 
rapidly growing market, as evinced by the number of companies traded, which grew from 80 in 
1986 to 288 in 2002, the last year in our sample. Over the same period, the total market 
capitalization of traded firms increased from $938 million to $34,402 million, while annual 
total trading volume leaped from $13 million to $70,756 million.   
An IPO offering requires approvals from both the Capital Market Board (CMB) and the 
ISE. The requirements include that IPO firms should have positive profits during the two years 
prior to the IPO, they should comply with disclosure requirements, and the offer rate should 
exceed a lower limit dictated by the CMB rules. The lower limit is a negative step function of 
firm’s market capitalization.2  
Our sample period covers 13 years, from January 1, 1990 (the earliest year for which 
IPO characteristics data are available) through December 31, 2002 (thereby permitting at least 
three years of post-IPO trading for all stocks in the sample). Price and volume data are 
collected from Datastream, and IPO characteristics are obtained from the web page of the ISE. 
Issues that have considerable missing values in Datastream are excluded. This was the case for 
several stocks. For many IPOs, volume data in the first few weeks are missing in Datastream. 
Missing values in these cases are filled using weekly bulletins of the ISE.  During the sample 
period there were 298 IPOs in the Istanbul Stock Exchange. The final sample in this paper 
consists of 181 IPOs for which we have complete data. 
Table I shows IPO activity over the sample period with some selected characteristics. 
One can make several observations from the table. One observation is that IPO activity shows 
considerable time variation. Based on the number of IPOs and total proceeds, 2000 is the most 
active year. The sharp decline in IPO activity after the most active year reflects the economic 
crisis that began in February 2001 and became one of the largest crises since modern Turkey 
was established in 1923.
3
  Another observation is that some of the IPOs in the initial years were 
those of state owned enterprises (privatizations). The table also indicates that during the initial 
years most of the IPOs were the sale of existing shares (secondary) by pre-IPO shareholders. 
Over time, the fraction of IPOs in which primary shares are offered has increased. Finally, time 
variation in average underpricing is evident.  1990 and 1995 are years with the largest 
underpricing, and the post-crisis year, 2002, is the only year when average underpricing is 
negative. The negative underpricing in 2002 probably reflects the effect of low demand 
(Benveniste and Spindt (1989)) after the start of the crisis.
4
 
In our analysis, we examine the relation between share retention, initial return, and 
trading volume. Share retention is the difference between number of shares outstanding after 
the IPO and number of shares offered scaled by number of shares outstanding after the IPO. 
Initial return is defined as the relative price change from the offering price to the market price 
at the end of the first day of trading adjusted by the market return on the first day. Trading 
                                                 
2
 At the end of 2002, the step function rule was as follows: For firms with a market capitalization up to TL 750 
billion, the minimum limit is 15%, between TL 750 billion and TL1,500 billion, the minimum limit is 10%, more 
than TL1,500 billion, the minimum limit is 5%. 
3
 The combined effect of high real interest rates, a large devaluation, the huge fiscal cost of bank restructuring and 
deep recession caused the stock of public debt to rise significantly from 58 percent of GNP at the end of 2000 to 
95 percent of GNP by the end of 2001. 
4
 We repeated our analyses by excluding post-crisis IPOs from the sample. The reported findings are robust to the 
shortening of the sample period. 
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activity is measured by turnover, which is defined as daily trading volume scaled by the 
number of shares outstanding.  
Our regressions include several control variables, which others have found to be 
significant explainers of IPO initial returns.  Beatty and Ritter (1986), Ritter (1984), and Rock 
(1986) explain underpricing based on information asymmetry among traders. Underpricing is 
greatest for those issues that are subject to the greatest ex ante uncertainty. We use firm size, 
gross proceeds from the offering, and age of the firm as proxies for ex ante uncertainty.  Since 
large firms have less uncertainty than smaller firms, we expect a negative relationship between 
underpricing and firm size (Ritter (1991)). Size is measured as the natural logarithm of the 
dollar value of total market capitalization at offer price.  Furthermore, since larger issues are 
generally easier to value, we expect that the relationship between underpricing and gross 
proceeds from the offering is negative (Booth and Chua (1996)). Proceeds is the natural 
logarithm of the dollar value of gross proceeds.  Finally, investors have more information about 
older firms than younger ones. Since uncertainty for older firms is lower, a lower level of 
underpricing is expected for older firms. Age is the difference between the year of the IPO and 
the year of foundation. 
In addition to the three measures of ex ante uncertainty, the following control variables 
are used in the analysis.  These are market return (Mret) and market volatility (Mvol) before the 
IPO date, and three IPO characteristics, namely the offering of shares by state owned 
enterprises (Privat), the sale of newly issued shares (Primary), and the existence of information 
asymmetry between the issuing firm and its underwriter (Selfoff).
5
 Hanley (1993) finds a 
positive relation between initial return and market index return before the initial public 
offering. Mret is defined as the percentage change in Datastream’s Turkish Market daily index 
over the 40-day period preceding the initial trading day. 
When the stock market return is volatile, the firm may increase underpricing to reduce 
the probability of unsuccessful offer (Paudyal, Saaddouni and Briston (1998)). Mvol is 
calculated as the standard deviation of daily returns of Datastream’s Turkish stock market 
index over the 40-day period preceding the initial trading day. 
During the first few years in the sample period several state owned enterprises used 
IPOs as first step in their privatization.  Assuming that these firms will be managed more 
efficiently once they become public, this may imply less underpricing for them (Kiymaz 
(2000)). Privat is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the IPO is a privatization, and zero 
otherwise. 
An IPO can be the offering of newly issued (primary) shares, the sale of shares 
(secondary) by  pre-IPO shareholders or a combination of these (Zheng et al. (2005)). Primary 
is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the IPO includes the sale of primary shares, and 
zero otherwise. 
It is possible that there is information asymmetry between the firm and its underwriter 
regarding the demand for the IPO shares (Baron (1982) and Aktas et al. (2003)). This is likely 
to affect the level of underpricing. However, if the issuing firm and its underwriter belong to 
the same group or family the information asymmetry will disappear. Selfoff is a dummy 
variable taking a value of one if this is the case, and zero otherwise. 
Table II shows descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study. Mean (median) 
value of market adjusted initial return is 12.4% (7.5%).  Minimum and maximum values are -
                                                 
5
 We also used sector dummies as control variables. Firms are classified into three groups based on their sector. 
These are industrials, financial, and others. 
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29.7% and 230%, respectively. Mean (median) value of share retention rate equals 76.4% 
(83.3%). Most of the listed Turkish firms are controlled by families, as in Italy and some other 
countries.  Their unwillingness to share control of these companies is likely a reason for the 
relatively high share retention. Rows 3-6 report the distribution of time-series averages of daily 
turnover measured over different time intervals. Consistent with U.S. findings, turnover is 
remarkably high during the first few weeks; thereafter it quickly falls to equilibrium levels. 
Mean and median values for firm size (gross proceeds) are $217 million ($28 million) and $48 
million ($8 million), respectively. There is a huge difference between the maximum and 
minimum values for both firm size and gross proceeds. Both measures of central tendency are 
positive for market return during the 40-day period prior the IPO date. Finally, for the average 
firm in the sample it took 17 years after its foundation to get the listing at the exchange. 
Table III shows the correlation matrix for the explanatory variables. Firm size is highly 
correlated with both share retention (0.54) and gross proceeds (0.92). As firm size grows a 
smaller fraction of the firm is offered in the IPO. Recall that the rules of the CMB dictate a 
lower limit for the offer rate, which is a negative function of firm size. The negative sample 
correlation between firm size and offer rate may just be a reflection of this rule. As Table II 
shows, the variability of firm size is much higher than that of share retention (coefficients of 
variation are 5.90 and 0.24, respectively). Since gross proceeds is defined as the product of firm 
size and shares offered, most of the variability of gross proceeds comes from that of firm size. 
 
III. Empirical Analysis 
 Our first hypothesis is that share retention is positively related to IPO underpricing. It is 
informative to examine the bivariate relationship first. For that purpose, IPOs are classified into 
five groups based on their share retention. Since the distribution of share retention is not 
uniform, these groups contain unequal number of stocks. The group with the lowest share 
retention, group 1 contains 22 IPOs, while groups 2-5 contain 34, 41, 56, and 28 IPOs, 
respectively. 
 Figure 1 shows mean and median initial return for each share retention group. A u-
shaped relation is observed between share retention and underpricing. Moreover, underpricing 
is larger for firms with the lowest retention rate than those with the highest share retention.  
This is inconsistent with the reasoning in Zheng et al. (2005), which argues that issuers use 
underpricing to neutralize the negative effect of share retention on aftermarket liquidity. 
To formally test this hypothesis we estimate: 
 
                            , εθZRetentionααIR iii10i       (1) 
 
where the dependent variable is the market-adjusted initial return. Retention is fraction of 
shares retained, and Z refers to a vector of control variables affecting initial return.  
The regression results using White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are 
presented in Table IV. In model 1, the coefficient of share retention is not significant and 
supports the bivariate relation shown in Figure 1.
6
 This means that Zheng et al. (2005) 
explanation that higher the share retention calls for more underpricing to maximize liquidity is 
not supported by the Turkish data.  
                                                 
6
 Over the sample period 1990-1996, Kiymaz (2000) also reports no significant relation between share retention 
and underpricing. 
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As expected, several control variables have significant coefficient estimates. In model 1, 
size and prior market return are both significant and have the predicted sign. Models 2 and 3 
use different combinations of explanatory variables. In addition to prior market return, size, 
gross proceeds, and privatization are statistically significant in at least one model. Both size and 
gross proceeds are proxies for ex ante uncertainty and their coefficients have the predicted 
negative sign. Moreover, a rising market increases the extent of underpricing consistent with 
the finding in Hanley (1993). The negative coefficient on the privatization dummy indicates 
that less underpricing is observed for firms that sell shares to public as a first step in 
privatization. Overall, these results are consistent with prior research on IPO underpricing in 
the ISE (Kiymaz (2000) and Aktas et al. (2003)). 
The lack of support for the first hypothesis only indicates that the assumption in Zheng 
et al. (2005) that issuers simultaneously decide on share retention and underpricing is not true 
for the Turkish IPOs. It does not imply the absence of a relationship between underpricing and 
trading volume. Neither Booth and Chua (1996) nor Reese (2003) assigns a role to share 
retention in explaining the link between underpricing and liquidity.  
Before testing the second hypothesis, it may be informative to examine the time-series 
behavior of trading volume. Since trading volume is a relatively volatile measure, weekly 
averages of daily turnover are formed for each firm. Sample IPOs are divided into two groups 
based on the sign of initial returns. Figure 2 presents the time-series behavior of weekly 
averages of daily turnover for these two groups over a period of 156 weeks. Consistent with 
prior research, turnover is very high for both groups during the initial weeks. Until about week 
40, underpriced group has notably higher turnover than the overpriced group. Thereafter, the 
difference becomes very small although the underpriced group continues to display a higher 
turnover.  
To formally test the second hypothesis that underpricing is associated with higher 
trading volume in both the short-run and the long-run, we estimate:  
 
           ,  εθZRetentionαIRααTO iii210i       (2) 
 
where the dependent variable is average daily turnover calculated over four different time 
periods: 1) The five-week period after the IPO, 2) The remaining 47 weeks during the first 
year, 3) the second year after the IPO, 4) the third year after the IPO. IR is the market-adjusted 
initial return, Retention is fraction of shares retained, and Z is a vector of control variables 
affecting initial return. 
As in the regression to explain market-adjusted initial return, we use different 
combinations of explanatory variables. Because of multicollinearity (see Table III) we avoid 
using size and retention (gross proceeds) in the same model. However, it is clear that in a cross-
sectional regression we need to control for the negative effect of share retention on volume. As 
a compromise, we define a second measure of turnover as the ratio of trading volume to the 
number of shares offered. We use the first measure of turnover whenever share retention is one 
of the explanatory variables and use the second measure otherwise. 
The results (not reported) indicate no significant relation between underpricing and 
turnover. This is rather unexpected given the difference in turnover, especially during the first 
year, between underpriced and overpriced IPOs as shown in Figure 2. To explore this, we 
reexamined the time-series behavior of trading volume this time by classifying IPOs into three 
groups as overpriced, mildly underpriced, and heavily underpriced. The resulting graph (not 
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reported) indicates that the turnover of the overpriced group quickly falls to its equilibrium 
level by the end of third week. For the other two groups, it takes most of the initial year for 
turnover to settle down to its equilibrium level. Moreover, the mildly and heavily underpriced 
groups display a remarkably similar pattern.  This behavior suggests that the relation between 
underpricing and trading volume may be asymmetric. 
The second hypothesis is tested again using the following empirical model that allows for 
asymmetry:  
 
      εθZRetentionαDIRα IRααTO iii3negi2i10i ,     (3) 
 
where all the variables are same as those in equation (2) with one exception. Instead of using 
initial return as an explanatory variable, we use two terms that depend on it. IR  is absolute 
value of initial return; and Dneg is a dummy variable that takes the value of one when initial 
return is negative, and zero otherwise. This specification allows the underpricing-turnover 
relation to be different for positive and nonpositive initial returns. α1 shows the coefficient on 
initial return for underpriced issues, while the sum of α1 and α2 indicates the coefficient on 
initial return for overpriced issues. 
To examine the relation between underpricing and short term turnover we estimate the 
empirical model twice: (1) using average daily turnover calculated over the first five weeks 
after the IPO as the dependent variable, and (2) using average daily turnover over the rest of the 
first year.
7
  Table V presents the results. Considering first five weeks, all the models indicate 
that overpricing is negatively related to trading volume in the short run. The magnitude of 
initial return has no relation to trading volume once underpricing is positive. In model 1, where 
the initial definition of turnover is used, share retention has significantly negative coefficient. 
In model 2 (3), where the second measure of turnover is used, there is a significant negative 
relation between firm size (gross proceeds) and turnover. All three models show that those 
IPOs in which primary shares are sold have significantly higher turnover. Finally, IPOs that 
were made under the privatization plan have significantly lower turnover. 
When average daily turnover over the rest of the first year is used, the strength of the 
asymmetric relation becomes weaker. Overpricing is negatively related to trading volume, only 
in model 1. When we repeat the analysis by using the average daily turnover calculated over 
the entire first year (results not reported) the asymmetric relation holds in all the three models. 
To sum up, the evidence in Table V indicates that there is an unusual positive relationship 
between initial return and short-term turnover. 
We now test if the observed asymmetric relation also holds for long-term turnover. 
Table VI presents the results when average daily turnover over the second (third) year is used 
as the dependent variable in the same empirical model.  For both periods, initial return is not 
significant in any of the three specifications. This means that the asymmetric relation that exists 
during the first year disappears in the long run. The same set of control variables that were 
significant in the short run regressions, namely share retention, size, gross proceeds, and the 
primary dummy, are also significant and have the same sign in the long run regressions.  
It is interesting to interpret the significant coefficients on control variables in turnover 
regressions. Size and, whenever it is absent, gross proceeds almost always have significant 
negative coefficients both in the short term and long term. It is reasonable to expect that the 
                                                 
7
 Because the initial few weeks after IPO usually are atypical, we treat the first five weeks separately. 
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visibility of a firm increases with its size. Based on Merton (1987), which argues that investors 
only trade in securities they have heard about, we would expect a positive relationship. Since 
these are proxies for uncertainty, this finding indicates the higher uncertainty the higher is 
turnover. Assuming that proceeds from the issuance of new shares is used in financing real 
investments, uncertainty about these new investments is likely to increase uncertainty about the 
firm value. The significant positive coefficient on PRIMARY dummy indicates again that the 
higher uncertainty the higher is turnover. To sum up, it appears that uncertainty is associated 
with higher trading volume both in the short term and in the long term. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
Our examination of the relationship between initial return, share retention and trading 
volume using data on the Turkish IPOs reveals the following:  First, there is no significant 
relation between share retention and underpricing.  Firms do not use underpricing as a tool to 
make up the reduction in liquidity caused by higher share retention. Thus, our data do not 
support the explanation given in Zheng et al. (2005).  
Second, we find a significant positive relationship between underpricing and trading 
volume in the short-term. However, unlike the U.S. evidence, this relationship is an asymmetric 
one. We show that for overpriced issues the magnitude of initial return is negatively related to 
trading volume. For underpriced issues, on the other hand, there is no significant relation 
between the magnitude of initial return and trading volume. It appears that investors react 
negatively to overpriced issues, affecting trading volume for at least a year. 
Third, we report that a positive link between short-term volume and long-term volume 
is missing in the Turkish market. In other words, underpricing and trading volume are not 
related in the long-term. Based on the reasoning by Booth and Chua (1996) and Reese (2003), 
which explains why there should be such a link, one may argue that the lack of persistency in 
initial broad ownership and/or investor interest may be the reason for the missing link.  
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Table I 
IPO Activity and Selected Sample Characteristics 
 
Year 
Number of 
IPO 
Initial  
Return 
Total 
Proceeds 
Primary 
Shares Privatization Selfoffer 
1990 20 30.03%     966,263,680  2 3 8 
1991 12 4.59%     126,844,920  2 6 3 
1992 8 4.35%       72,804,736  2 0 1 
1993 11 12.33%     121,493,691  2 2 3 
1994 15 9.13%     183,274,155  5 0 4 
1995 19 27.17%     158,596,002  13 0 4 
1996 20 11.69%     131,678,540  11 0 8 
1997 19 3.82%     348,614,888  14 0 8 
1998 17 8.43%     354,954,509  16 0 8 
1999 9 15.05%       89,398,467  6 0 6 
2000 27 7.65%  2,540,963,277  22 0 7 
2001 1 0.72%           237,367  0 0 1 
2002 3 -7.24%       53,350,533  1 0 1 
 
Initial Return is the average of market adjusted initial returns. Total Proceeds shows the total dollar 
value of gross proceeds. Primary Shares gives the frequency of IPOs  which includes the sale of newly 
issued shares.  Privatization  is the frequency of IPOs in which shares of state owned enterprises are 
offered, and Selfoffer  indicates the frequency of IPOs in which the issuing firm and its underwriter 
belong to the same group or family 
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Table II  
Descriptive Statistics  
 
 
 
  Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
IR 0.124 0.075 2.305 -0.297 0.257 4.555 34.353 
Retention 0.764 0.833 0.975 0.040 0.180 -2.159 7.871 
Turnover Weeks 1-5  28.597 10.417 687.849 0.051 67.653 6.350 54.672 
Turnover Weeks  6-52  16.126 9.929 485.007 0.037 37.537 10.921 136.119 
Turnover Year 2  14.734 9.397 97.821 0.047 16.619 2.081 7.962 
Turnover Year 3 14.073 7.518 113.411 0.069 17.821 2.870 13.390 
Size ($ 1,000s) 217,000 47,745 16,900,000 242 1,280,000 12.437 162.296 
Proceeds ($ 1,000s) 28,445 7,635 1,770,000 148 135,000 12.016 154.443 
Age 17.622 16.000 73.000 0.000 13.950 0.875 3.698 
Mret 0.133 0.047 1.467 -0.425 0.310 1.879 7.937 
Mvol 0.028 0.027 0.059 0.012 0.009 0.793 3.943 
 
 
IR is market adjusted initial return. Retention refers to the fraction of shares retained. Turnover Weeks i-j 
refers to the average daily volume between weeks i and j multiplied by 1,000 and scaled by the number 
of shares outstanding. Turnover Year i shows the average daily volume during year i multiplied by 1,000 
and scaled by the number of shares outstanding.  Size is measured as the dollar value of total market 
capitalization at offer price. Proceeds is defined as the dollar value of gross proceeds. Age is the 
difference between the year of the IPO and the year of foundation. Mret is defined as the percentage 
change in Datastream’s Turkish Market daily index over the 40-day period prior to the initial trading day. 
Mvol is calculated as the standard deviation of daily returns of Datastream’s Turkish stock market index 
over the 40-day period preceding the initial trading day. 
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Table III  
Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 IR Retention Size Proceeds Age Mret Mvol Primary Privat 
IR          
Retention -0.063         
Size -0.179 0.544        
Proceeds -0.179 0.221 0.923       
Age -0.012 0.378 0.292 0.183      
Mret 0.440 -0.046 -0.098 -0.085 -0.066     
Mvol -0.001 0.042 0.013 0.013 -0.011 -0.032    
Primary -0.114 -0.047 -0.043 -0.004 -0.160 0.002 0.114   
Privat -0.102 0.048 0.163 0.124 0.215 -0.084 -0.086 -0.270  
Selfoff 0.082 -0.202 -0.025 0.037 -0.084 0.007 0.120 -0.181 -0.136 
 
IR is market adjusted initial return. Retention refers to the fraction of shares retained. Size is measured 
as the natural logarithm of the dollar value of total market capitalization at offer price. Proceeds is the 
natural logarithm of the dollar value of gross proceeds. Age is the difference between the year of the 
IPO and the year of foundation. Mret is defined as the percentage change in Datastream’s Turkish 
Market daily index over the 40-day period prior to the initial trading day. Mvol is calculated as the 
standard deviation of daily returns of Datastream’s Turkish stock market index over the 40-day period 
prior to the initial trading day. Primary is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the IPO includes the 
sale of primary shares, and zero otherwise. Privat is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the IPO is 
a privatization, and zero otherwise. Selfoff is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the IPO is a self-
offered IPO, and zero otherwise.  
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Table IV 
Relation between Share Retention and Underpricing 
 
  Model1 
 
 Model2 
 
 Model3   
Intercept 0.536  0.505  0.518  
 (2.24) 
b
 (2.38) 
b
 (2.24) 
b
 
Retention -0.060      
 (0.44)      
Size   -0.024    
   (2.32) 
b
   
Proceeds -0.026    -0.026  
 (1.94) 
a
   (2.05) 
b
 
Age 0.000    0.001  
 (0.35)    (0.50)  
Mret 0.358  0.355  0.354  
 (2.64) 
c
 (2.60) 
b
 (2.61) 
c
 
Mvol 0.805  0.854  0.555  
 (0.58)  (0.60)  (0.37)  
Primary -0.054  -0.056  -0.064  
 (1.46)  (1.58)  (1.65)  
Privat     -0.097  
     (1.97) 
a
 
Selfoff 0.055  0.055  0.049  
 (1.28)  (1.31)  (1.16)  
Dfin -0.053  -0.062  -0.058  
 (0.86)  (1.07)  (1.01)  
Dind -0.006  -0.009  -0.019  
 (0.13)  (0.22)  (0.46)  
       
R-sq. 0.237  0.234  0.243  
Adj. R-sq. 0.197  0.203  0.203  
F-statistic 5.875  7.534  6.055  
p-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  
 
The dependent variable is market adjusted initial return (IR). Retention refers to fraction of shares 
retained. Size is measured as the natural logarithm of the dollar value of total market capitalization at 
offer price. Proceeds is the natural logarithm of the dollar value of gross proceeds. Age is the difference 
between the year of the IPO and the year of foundation. Mret is defined as the percentage change in 
Datastream’s Turkish Market daily index over the 40-day period prior to the initial trading day. Mvol is 
calculated as the standard deviation of daily returns of Datastream’s Turkish stock market index over 
the 40-day period prior to the initial trading day. Primary is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the 
IPO includes the sale of primary shares, and zero otherwise. Privat is a dummy variable taking a value 
of one if the IPO is a privatization, and zero otherwise. Selfoff is a dummy variable taking a value of one 
if the IPO is a self-offered IPO and zero otherwise. Dfin is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the 
offering is made by a financial firm, and zero otherwise. Dind is a dummy variable taking the value of 
one if the offering is made by an industrial firm, and zero otherwise. In parentheses are the t-statistics 
using White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.  a,b,c show statistical significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table V 
Relation between Underpricing and Short-term Turnover 
 
 Turnover Weeks 1-5  Turnover Weeks 6-52  
  Model1 
 
 Model2 
 
 Model3 
 
 Model1 
 
 Model2 
 
 Model3   
Intercept 0.200  -0.385  -0.134  0.042  -0.591  -0.140  
 (0.13)  (0.29)  (0.09)  (0.03)  (0.51)  (0.11)  
IR  0.249  0.341  0.272  -0.498  -0.356  -0.438  
 (0.43)  (0.57)  (0.46)  (1.10)  (0.70)  (0.90)  
IR DNeg -7.468  -6.489  -6.402  -3.652  -2.189  -2.610  
 (2.97) 
c
 (2.87) 
c
 (2.94) 
c
 (1.84) 
a
 (1.19)  (1.46)  
Retention -3.330      -2.817      
 (5.16) 
c
     (3.98) 
c
     
Size   -0.145      -0.167    
   (2.20) 
b
     (2.64) 
c
   
Proceeds -0.138    -0.161  -0.187    -0.206  
 (1.65)    (2.04) 
b
 (2.37) 
b
   (2.85) 
c
 
Age -0.003    0.000  -0.008    -0.004  
 (0.34)    (0.01)  (0.87)    (0.54)  
Mret 0.265  0.241  0.229  0.380  0.355  0.358  
 (0.81)  (0.77)  (0.71)  (1.20)  (1.17)  (1.17)  
Mvol 12.587  10.000  8.619  9.467  7.708  7.207  
 (0.90)  (0.72)  (0.62)  (0.81)  (0.72)  (0.66)  
Primary 1.265  1.178  1.108  1.081  1.004  0.980  
 (5.33) 
c
 (5.26) 
c
 (4.50) 
c
 (5.14) 
c
 (4.95) 
c
 (4.46) 
c
 
Privat     -0.704      -0.184  
     (1.76) 
a
     (0.41)  
Selfoff 0.292  0.262  0.233  0.149  0.106  0.117  
 (1.34)  (1.31)  (1.12)  (0.75)  (0.55)  (0.61)  
Dfin -1.726  -1.576  -1.656  -0.983  -0.916  -0.906  
 (4.74) 
c
 (4.89) 
c
 (5.26) 
c
 (3.05) 
c
 (3.23) 
c
 (3.40) 
c
 
Dind -1.368  -1.302  -1.414  -0.439  -0.417  -0.411  
 (3.72) 
c
 (4.45) 
c
 (4.59) 
c
 (1.43)  (1.78) 
a
 (1.57)  
             
R-sq. 0.355  0.243  0.250  0.340  0.220  0.230  
Adj. R-sq. 0.313  0.203  0.201  0.296  0.179  0.180  
F-statistic 8.409  6.083  5.089  7.854  5.370  4.565  
p-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Negative 7.677  6.784  7.270  4.031  1.728  2.658  
p-value 0.006  0.010  0.008  0.046  0.190  0.105  
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Table V 
Notes 
 
 
 
In Model 1 the dependent variable is the average daily volume between week i and j scaled by 
the number of shares outstanding. In Model 2 and Model 3, the dependent variable is the 
average daily volume between week i and j scaled by the number of shares offered in the IPO. 
IIRI is the absolute value of market adjusted initial return. DNeg is a dummy variable which is 
equal to one if IR is negative, and zero otherwise. Retention refers to the fraction of shares 
retained. Size is measured as the natural logarithm of the dollar value of total market 
capitalization at offer price. Proceeds is defined as the natural logarithm of the dollar value of 
gross proceeds. Age is the difference between the year of the IPO and the year of foundation. 
Mret is defined as the percentage change in Datastream’s Turkish Market daily index over the 
40-day period preceding the initial trading day. Mvol is calculated as the standard deviation of 
daily returns of Datastream’s Turkish stock market index over the 40-day period prior to the 
initial trading day. Primary is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the IPO includes the 
sale of primary shares, and zero otherwise. Privat is a dummy variable taking a value of one if 
the IPO is a privatization, and zero otherwise. Selfoff is a dummy variable taking a value of one 
if the IPO is a self-offered IPO, and zero otherwise. Dfin is a dummy variable which is equal to 
one if the offering is made by a financial firm, and zero otherwise. Dind is a dummy variable 
taking the value of one if the offering is made by an industrial firm, and zero otherwise. In 
parentheses are the t-statistics using White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
Negative gives the F statistic for the test that overpricing is significantly related to turnover.  
a,b,c show statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table VI 
Relation between Underpricing and Long-term Turnover 
 
    
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
     
 Turnover Year 2  Turnover Year 3  
  Model1 
 
 Model2 
 
 Model3 
 
 Model1 
 
 Model2 
 
 Model3   
Intercept -1.510  -2.405  -1.478  -0.458  -1.408  -0.297  
 (1.07)  (1.87) 
a
 (1.09)  (0.32)  (1.11)  (0.21)  
IR  -0.368  -0.204  -0.315  -0.774  -0.582  -0.709  
 (0.64)  (0.31)  (0.52)  (1.27)  (0.85)  (1.10)  
IR DNeg -0.688  0.753  1.064  -1.285  0.790  0.674  
 (0.27)  (0.35)  (0.51)  (0.53)  (0.39)  (0.34)  
Retention -2.298      -1.928      
 (3.46) 
c
     (2.97) 
c
     
Size   -0.093      -0.114    
   (1.38)      (1.72) 
a
   
Proceeds -0.149    -0.154  -0.185    -0.184  
 (1.79) 
a
   (1.96) 
a
 (2.07) 
b
   (2.28) 
b
 
Age -0.003    0.003  -0.009    -0.002  
 (0.32)    (0.43)  (1.14)    (0.32)  
Mret 0.471  0.442  0.453  0.187  0.183  0.177  
 (1.35)  (1.17)  (1.20)  (0.57)  (0.48)  (0.47)  
Mvol 13.639  13.218  11.913  -0.477  -0.784  -1.334  
 (1.04)  (1.04)  (0.93)  (0.04)  (0.07)  (0.11)  
Primary 1.005  0.895  0.847  0.720  0.619  0.567  
 (4.88) 
c
 (4.51) 
c
 (3.90) 
c
 (3.58) 
c
 (3.22) 
c
 (2.69) 
c
 
Privat     -0.526      -0.415  
     -1.086      -0.995  
Selfoff -0.137  -0.180  -0.186  -0.399  -0.453  -0.443  
 (0.62)  (0.81)  (0.84)  (1.90) 
a
 (2.02) 
b
 (1.99) 
b
 
Dfin -0.272  -0.253  -0.305  -0.062  -0.038  -0.125  
 (0.77)  (0.76)  (0.94)  (0.19)  (0.11)  (0.39)  
Dind -0.068  0.016  -0.075  -0.097  -0.019  -0.084  
 (0.22)  (0.06)  (0.27)  (0.33)  (0.07)  (0.31)  
             
R-sq. 0.279  0.175  0.196  0.260  0.134  0.164  
Adj. R-sq. 0.231  0.132  0.143  0.212  0.089  0.109  
F-statistic 5.897  4.033  3.713  5.370  2.948  2.992  
p-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.003  0.001  
Negative 0.163  0.059  0.117  0.678  0.009  0.000  
p-value 0.687  0.808  0.733  0.411  0.923  0.987  
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Table VI 
Notes 
 
 
 
In Model 1, the dependent variable is the average daily volume during year i scaled by the 
number of shares outstanding. In Model 2 and Model 3, the dependent variable is average daily 
volume during year i scaled by the number of shares offered in the IPO. IIRI is the absolute 
value of market adjusted initial return. DNeg is a dummy variable which is equal to one if IR is 
negative, and zero otherwise. Retention refers to fraction of shares retained. Size is measured as 
the natural logarithm of the dollar value of total market capitalization at offer price. Proceeds is 
defined as the natural logarithm of the dollar value of gross proceeds. Age is the difference 
between the year of the IPO and the year of foundation. Mret is defined as the percentage 
change in Datastream’s Turkish Market daily index over the 40-day period preceding the initial 
trading day. Mvol is calculated as the standard deviation of daily returns of Datastream’s 
Turkish stock market index over the 40-day period prior to the initial trading day. Primary is a 
dummy variable taking a value of one if the IPO includes the sale of primary shares, and zero 
otherwise. Privat is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the IPO is a privatization, and 
zero otherwise. Selfoff is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the IPO is a self-offered 
IPO and zero otherwise. Dfin is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the offering is made 
by a financial firm, and zero otherwise. Dind is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the 
offering is made by an industrial firm, and zero otherwise. In parentheses are the t-statistics 
using White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Negative gives the F statistic 
for the test that overpricing is significantly related to turnover.   
a,b,c show statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance & Business Ventures, Vol. 11, Iss. 3 
 
77 
 
 
Figure 1 
Relation between Share retention and Initial return 
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IPOs are classified into five groups based on their share retention. The cutoff levels of share retention 
for those five groups are 0.55, 0.80, 0.84, and 0.88, respectively. These five groups contain 22, 34, 41, 
56, and 28 IPOs, respectively. 
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Figure 2 
Weekly Averages of Daily Turnover 
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IPOs are classified into two groups based on their initial return. The overpriced group contains 43 
IPOs, while the underpriced group includes the remaining 138 IPOs. 
 
 
 
